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U.S. Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Panel Discussion ∗
MENZIES: I would like to begin by introducing the panel starting
at the far end. First is Kristen Boon, known to many of you; she is a
professor at the law school who specializes in international law and
publishes in that area. Her J.D. is from New York University; her
LL.M. is from Columbia. She has clerked in the Canadian Supreme
Court, and she has been my partner in fighting for this day, and glad
to have you here.
John Herbst. Ambassador John Herbst is, as you already know,
the Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.
He has served as Ambassador to Ukraine and Ambassador to Uzbekistan. Those I highlight because you need to know that he has received this government’s highest awards for his work in those areas.
He received a Presidential Distinguished Service Award for his work
in Ukraine, where he and his staff prevented the theft of an election
and preserved democracy for the people of that region. He received
the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award for his efforts to
facilitate the supply of our forces and the protection of our forces in
the Middle East, by creating an American Air Base, and supplies entering there. And so, John brings to his work a Bachelor of Science
in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, where he was Phi
Beta Kappa, and a Master of Law and Diplomacy, with Distinction,
from the Fletcher School. We are delighted to have you here, John,
and thank you for coming.
Ambassador James Dobbins currently works for the RAND Corporation, where he is the Director of the International Security and
∗
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Defense Policy Center. He has broad experience. He has served as
Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, as a Special Assistant to the
President for the Western Hemisphere, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans, and Ambassador to the
European Community. He was assigned, during the Clinton administration, almost all of the top issues that came up on the radar screen
in international affairs—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo. He was the
Bush administration’s first Special Envoy for Afghanistan, and he also
was the representative to the Afghan opposition in the wake of September 11, 2001. Also, he was my boss in the Foreign Service and is
one of the best people I have ever worked for. And thank you, Jim,
for coming today. Many of you have read his book Beginners Guide to
Nation Building and the two other members of that series. So Jim,
thank you.
The third is Daniel Serwer, who is Vice President of the Center
for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations and the Centers of
Innovation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). That does
not tell you all about Daniel. He has worked in the areas of Afghanistan, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq, and Sudan while at the Institute of
Peace. He is a former Foreign Service Officer. He did terrific work
in Bosnia as the person that held the federation together—the federation of Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats—during the most critical period of peacebuilding in the area. Daniel is single-handedly responsible for taking the United States Institute of Peace from being a
think tank to a do tank—an operational unit. For those of you who
do not know the U.S. Institute of Peace, it was funded by the U.S.
government but basically kept at arms length and rigorously independent. Daniel has made it into a player in providing support to
countless international crises. So, I am delighted to have you here
too.
With that introduction, I am going to start by asking a question,
and that is how we are going to do this. We will open it to the floor in
a few minutes, but I am going to take the chair and ask Ambassador
Herbst what is new on the horizon, in terms of the U.S. response to
post-conflict reconstruction.
1
HERBST: Thank you. S/CRS really has two major imperatives.
First, they ensure that the U.S. government is organized in a unified
way to handle stabilization or reconstruction crises, to make sure the
next time we have such a crisis that all elements of U.S. power are
used to address it, that there is a single comprehensive plan which
1
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uses all elements of that power, and that it is implemented effectively
and efficiently.
The second part of our mission is to make sure we have all the
trained civilians with the right skill sets, the right equipment, ready to
go in such a crisis. And here is where we are in achieving those objectives this morning.
There has been an agreement in the InterAgency regarding the
creation of what we call the InterAgency Management System for responding to a stabilization crisis. The InterAgency Management System has the following elements.
First, you have a policy level group at the Assistant Secretary
Level; it is called the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
(CRSG). It consists of every agency which has a role in a crisis. It is
chaired by a combination of the Regional Secretary and Senior Re2
gional National Director of the NSC and the head of S/CRS. I am
glad of the fact that you have three chairpeople consolidating
strength; it is a bureaucratic compromise. By stepping into a real crisis, senior leaders of our government choose to take charge, and the
S/CRS will have someone to run the policies and make sure that the
trainings are on time.
Under the CRSG is something called the Secretariat, run by my
office. It is InterAgency; it is designed to write a plan of operations
for the U.S. government on the civilian side in a stabilization crisis.
Equally important, it has Pentagon participation to ensure that military and civilian plans are completely in harmony.
To further ensure such harmony, if there is a stabilization crisis
where there is a military component, we have something called Integration Planning Cell. This Integration Planning Cell is run by the
S/CRS; it is also an InterAgency group. It will deploy to the headquarters of the military that is running the operation. If this is a U.S.run military operation, it will deploy to the relevant Combatant
Command. At the intervention as to the operations in the Middle
3
East, it would deploy to CENTCOM ; if it is Latin America, it would
4
deploy to SOUTHCOM. If it is an international military operation—
for example, the U.N.—this outfit would deploy to wherever the U.N.
military headquarters are. The purpose here is to make sure at the
field level that military and civilian plans are completely in sync.

2

3
4
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Finally, the InterAgency Management System has something
5
called Advance Civilian Teams. These are our equivalent of PRTs.
These are an InterAgency group. They would be under S/CRS leadership in most cases. If they deploy to a country where there is a U.S.
embassy, it would be under the Chief of Mission; if not, it would be
the senior U.S. civilian component to the country.
Their job is to run all civilian operations or all U.S. civilian operations in such a crisis. If it is a country which is large and which has
many, many requirements, there would be field Advance Civilian
Teams operated by the country under the leadership of the Advance
Civilian Team headquarters. This Advance Civilian Team, as designed, can work in an operation where the U.S. is the principal
power, and it can work in a multi-lateral setting with other countries.
It could work in a sector where the U.N. has the leadership. It is designed to function in all kinds of international settings. This is the
agreed [manner in which we now proceed] in a crisis .
The second part of our mission is to make sure that we have the
civilians ready to go out to such crises. We have devised, and it has
been approved by our government, a three-pool system of civilian
employees. The employees we are looking for need to have the skills
required when there is no functioning government. So we are looking for people, for these pools to be comprised of people, who have
the following sets of skills. There will be all types of engineering—
road engineers, civil engineers, water and electrical engineers. There
will be people who can handle public administration—public health
officials, city planners. All the people involved in rule of law, meaning police, judges, corrections officials, attorneys, and also the economists. In some instances, there might be port operators. All the
people that we need to stand up a government which does not exist
or to help any number of functions for a government that does not
perform very well.
We have agreed to meet three different pools in which we will
find people with these skills. The first pool is something we call the
active response pool. These are people whose full-time job it will be
to deploy to countries in crisis. They will work for the federal gov6
ernment, State Department, USAID, and other federal agencies.
Right now, the U.S. government has a ten-person capability,
which is a tiny, tiny capability, which sits in my office. But there has

5
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been legislation proposed by Senators [Richard] Lugar and [Joe]
8
Biden which would call for an advance response pool of 250 of
whom roughly forty percent would be the State Department, forty
percent would be USAID, and twenty percent sitting around the InterAgency. These folks would be trained and equipped to deploy
within forty-eight hours of the decision. They would be truly a rapid
response force for civilian needs.
The second pool of people is what we call the stand-by response
pool. The same legislation under Lugar-Biden calls for a stand-by response pool of 2000 people. They would also sit throughout the Federal InterAgency. They would sit, again, forty percent at State, forty
percent at the USAID, and twenty percent elsewhere. These folks
would have full-time day jobs. They would deploy in a crisis. They
would train for two or three weeks a year. It would take about fortyfive to sixty days to get them out to the field. We feel we could have
eighty percent of our active response corps deployed at any one time.
We could have anywhere from ten to twenty-five percent of the standby corps deployed at any one time.
The third component of this civilian response capability is a civilian reserve corps. President Bush mentioned this during his State of
9
the Union speech in January. This corps would function much like
our military reserve system. People in civilian life, and state and local
government, would sign up. They would sign up for a four-year period. Like our stand-by corps, they would train for two or three weeks
a year. They would have a commitment within their four-year period
of service to deploy for up to one year. We feel we would be able to
deploy twenty-five percent of them at any given time and it would
take about two months to get them out into the field.
My office, right now, is working on creating, as soon as possible,
a 500-person civilian reserve corps. We received appropriations in
May [2007] to create such a corps. Unfortunately, we do not have authorized legislation yet passed which enables us to actually use this
plan.
The Lugar-Biden legislation which I referred to is right now in
consideration in the Senate. There is a similar bill proposed by Con10
gressman [Samuel S.] Farr which is under consideration in the
7
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House. It will take us approximately one year from the passage of
that legislation to create this 500-person civilian reserve corps.
We see this as a prototype for a larger corps to be created. If you
were to create a civilian reserve corps of 2000, and couple that with
an active response corps of 250, and a stand-by response corps of
2000, we would be able to deploy about 1200 civilians overseas within
sixty minutes, within sixty days of a decision.
(Audience Laughter)
A couple of other points. This capability is absolutely essential;
this is understood. The U.S. government is going to have this capability at some point in the near future, and this capability can be used
both by ourselves alone and in multi-lateral settings. S/CRS has excellent relations with our counterpart offices elsewhere around the
world, and Clint was right to say that the U.S. government’s capability
11
is not the first internationally, the greater capability probably belongs to our Canadian friends in the START office. They have a significant budget. They have the ability to put people in the field in
large numbers which we do not have today. But if we establish the
capabilities I have described, we will certainly launch to the forefront.
We have excellent cooperation with our friends in the E.U. and the
12
U.N. I have worked closely with Carolyn MacAskie, who I will speak
with later this afternoon. This truly is the wave of the future.
MENZIES: Thank you very much. I should mention, too, that is a
very good thing that you have mentioned, to hear of the developments and about the reserve. But I wanted to mention also that
Daniel could almost get the award for “I told you so” for having—how
should I put this—warned early and often that our efforts in Iraq
were not adequately planned. Dan, where do you see the failures and
how do you think the new approaches we are taking respond to that?
SERWER: I was not planning to start with Iraq, but I am just back
from Baghdad and Kabul and I can say a few words about Iraq. You
know, frankly, Iraq was done by a pick-up team—a pick-up team,
which had no idea of the depths of the problems that we faced. And
my colleagues and I have taken a close look at what went wrong in
Iraq in a chapter in a book that I assume will be published this fall.
To give you the bottom line, what happened was they undermined their own plan basically. Their plan was decapitation—use the
existing structures to govern Iraq with a new leadership. When the
ministries were looted, that plan went by the wayside. You no longer
11
12
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had in Iraq the institutional setup to run a decapitated and bleeding
government. And I actually believe that almost all the serious errors
were made within a month or two months of victory and that we have
played catch-up ever since, sometimes with enormous courage, sometimes with enormous results, not always, but still playing catch-up,
and we have not caught up because the situation has largely spiraled
out of control.
I just got back. I was in Baghdad recently at a reconciliation
conference for a community called Mahmoudiyah; it is a community
you know as the Triangle of Death on the Southern end of Baghdad.
It was a reconciliation conference for tribal sheikhs, and they, both
Sunni and Shia, very much wanted to begin to view the issues that
could stabilize their community, and that has been made possible by
a much better security situation.
I do not share the view of those who say that nothing has
changed. I was in Baghdad for five days. I think I heard two detonations in five days, when you heard two detonations an hour at some
points in Baghdad. Certainly the situation has improved.
But can the Iraqis hold the situation we have created? I think
the answer for that question is no one believes that they can. In addition, I hasten to add that the Iraqis who came to help us in Baghdad
through Tikrit, most of them reported that the situation with those
places is not secure in any part because of the lack of American military presence. So it is a very mixed picture, certainly not uniformly
deteriorating, as the Iraq Study Group said almost a year ago. I was
Executive Director in the Iraq Study Group’s report after, and we certainly thought at that time—December of last year [2006]—that there
was a marked deterioration in the situation. I would not say that
right now on all fronts, but I also would not say that I see much possibility for anything that even remotely resembles the goals set out in
the administration’s paper on victory.
John, I am wondering if I could add a word or two to what John
said, because I think John talked about two absolutely essential components of the future of how we approach these operations: interagency coordination and the civilian reserve. Our institute, which
did help to conceive of the civilian reserve, is now working on two
other things that I know are also very close to John’s heart, and I
wanted to mention it here.
One is the issue of developing doctrine. You cannot just have a
group of civilians who know how to fix water systems know how to run
a local government. You have to have them working within a strategic framework that they all understand in advance and that the mili-
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tary folks also understand in advance. And it is my belief that that
common framework should be more or less constant from operation
to operation, and if it is done at a sufficient level of generality, that
can happen.
So with John’s—what shall I say—blessing, USIP and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the U.S. Army, from
which there are a number of people in the room, we are working to13
gether with a lot of NGOs, with a lot of other organizations, trying
to develop a draft doctrine that would be the bedrock on which the
civilian reserve would sit in a certain sense.
If you develop doctrine, you have to train, as well; you have to
train whether you have doctrine or not. At the moment, there are
many different ideas about training. Our institute is forging ahead
with the development of an education training center, sometimes
known as The Peace Academy, that will sit at the new headquarters of
USIP almost across the street from the State Department on the Mall
at 23rd [Street] and Constitution [Avenue]. And the unique thing, I
think, about the USIP’s training capability is that we have the capability to train military, civilians, and NGOs in the same place, and I
think that is, outside the academic world, in government, here in the
government world, there are actually very few other institutions that
can do that kind of training.
And I think, if you do not want to see more Iraqs, these are some
of the essential elements: interagency coordination that John talked
about, the civilian reserve, a professional civilian reserve that has doctrine and is well-trained and well-trained in a way that is joint. And by
joint, I do not mean only civilian and military, but also NGOs and
schools.
MENZIES: Thank you Daniel. Jim, you have been the author of, I
think, one of the most successful post-conflict reconstructions, but
also you played an absolutely critical role in what was initially not a
military intervention role, or at least not a military formal intervention in Afghanistan. What do you think are the deficits in what we
are doing? What should we be doing differently? How does it effect
the neighborhood.
DOBBINS: Thank you, John. I think both Clint Williamson and
John Herbst do deserve a lot of credit for turning around an administration that was initially disinclined to get seriously engaged in postconflict reconstruction and nation-building, but I am a little worried
about the durability of the changes that they have been able to intro13
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duce because when administrations change, a lot of good things, as
well as some bad things, can get thrown overboard. And if you remember back, looking at the American occupation of Iraq, you might
think that this was the first time we had ever done something like
this. It was one unanticipated challenge after another; it was one improvised response after another.
In fact, of course, it was not the first time that we had done
something like this. In fact, it was the seventh time in a little more
than a decade that the United States had liberated a society and then
tried to rebuild it. In 1991, we had gone into Kuwait. We then went
into Somalia, and to Haiti, and to Bosnia, and to Kosovo, and to Afghanistan, and finally, into Iraq. And of those seven societies, six are
Muslim. The only one of them that is not Muslim is Haiti. So, when
the American Army went into Iraq in 2003, there was no army in the
world with more experience in nation-building than the American.
And incidentally, there was no Western army in the world with more
experience operating within a Muslim society than the American
Army. So you have to ask how we could do this so often and yet do it
so badly.
And the lesson, and the reason goes back to the controversies
that surrounded the whole nation-building paradigm in the 1990s
that tended to discredit this form of behavior, even as it was beginning to bear considerable success. The pace of these kinds of missions grew very substantially after the end of the Cold War. During
the Cold War, the United States invaded a new country about once
every ten years, so you had Grenada, Dominican Republic, Lebanon,
[and] Panama. In the ‘90s, that went up from once every ten years to
once every two years, and the duration of these missions was much
longer.
The U.N.’s record went even more quickly. During the Cold
War, the U.N. launched a new peacekeeping operation on the average of about once every four years. Since 1989, the U.N. launches a
new peacekeeping operation every six months. And these missions
are now lasting eight to ten years. So, if you are doing one every two
years, pretty soon you are doing three or four at the same time as the
United States has done. If you are doing one every six months, you
are doing two dozen at the same time, which is where the U.N. is at
the moment.
And these are expensive, and they are intensive, manpowerintensive, and the U.S. Congress and the American public were getting fed up with this in the 1990s. It was a new burden. We paid
twenty-five percent of all the U.N.’s costs and, of course, one-hundred
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percent of our own, and, at least in the early years, it did not look like
a particularly useful form of activity. You know, in the popular mind,
it is the failures that linger. For every one person who can remember
what the U.N. did in Cambodia or Namibia or El Salvador, there are
a hundred who remember Rwanda or Srebrenica or have watched
Blackhawk Down. And so these were the impressions that were formed
and, as a result, when the new administration came in in 2001, they
had pledged they were not going to do nation-building, and they
were determined, when stuck with it, to do it very differently. And essentially, it fell overboard, everything that we had learned in the preceding decade.
And we had learned a good deal in the preceding decade. Both
the U.N. and the U.S. slowly got better at these operations. If you
look at the progression of the United States from Somalia to Haiti to
Bosnia and Kosovo, you find each of them was better prepared, more
professionally managed, and had a smoother transition than the ones
that preceded it. And the U.N. had a similar improvement in its success rate. But this was tossed overboard, first in Afghanistan and then
particularly in Iraq, where we tried a sort of a nation-building on the
cheap approach, as if the lessons that we learned in the ‘90s could be
ignored, and those lessons were important.
They were, first of all, that there is a big relationship between
input and output, that military manpower and economic assistance
are key variables for producing security and economic growth. And if
you put in low levels of military manpower and economic assistance,
what you get are low levels of security and economic growth. This was
a lesson that escaped the administration in its early years.
Similarly, the role of neighboring states. If the neighbors do not
want you to put a broken society back together again, you are not going to succeed because they simply have too much access and too
much influence, and too much at stake to stand aside. They are going to interfere and they are often going to interfere in quite unhelpful ways.
So I think that it is to be applauded that the administration has
embraced this paradigm. They do not call it nation-building; they
call it stabilization or reconstruction, but they essentially mean the
same thing, and [the administration has] begun to take it more seriously. I am concerned, however, if the administration’s reaction to
the initial failures in Iraq is we have to do better next time. It is not
clear that that is the American people’s reaction. The American
people’s reaction may well be we better not do this again next time, a
sort of post–Viet Nam phenomenon, where we forgot everything we
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knew about counterinsurgency and went back to defending the Fulda
Gap, and the result was that we spent five years in Iraq relearning
those lessons very painfully. And it was not until General Patraeus
was assigned that traditional approaches to counterinsurgency that
had been worked out through dozens of different experiences by the
United States and other nations were finally applied and have begun
to have some modicum of success.
So I am concerned that we may go through another one of these
rejections, and I just hope that the American people can somehow
retain two conclusions at the same time. Yes, sure, do not invade
large hostile Middle Eastern countries on the basis of flawed intelligence from a very narrow and unrepresentative coalition. Okay, that
is a good lesson. But if Iraq was a war of choice and the choice is a
poor one, Afghanistan rightfully was, and both of them left us with
heavy burdens for reconstruction and stabilization. And we are going
to find that, while we do not have to engage in every one of these
missions that appears on the horizon, we are going to be engaged in
some of them, and we are going to really have to learn a lot better.
So I hope that Iraq does not color the American perceptions of
this activity in an irremediable way because it is important to recognize that, despite the occasional failures, and sometimes quite spectacular failures, there are tens of millions of people around the world
who are living today at peace, and in most cases under freely elected
governments, because American troops or NATO troops or European
troops or U.N. troops went in and separated the combatants, disarmed the contending factions, oversaw a process of holding elections, and then stayed around long enough to ensure that those governments could take hold.
And so it is, in places like Mozambique and Cambodia and El
Salvador and Namibia and Sierra Leone and Liberia and East Timor
and Albania and Macedonia and Bosnia and Kosovo, that, as I said,
people are living in peace, and in almost all those cases under freely
elected governments, because the international community, in one
guise or another, conducted those kinds of operations. And it is going to be very important that we continue to develop our capabilities
and that the kinds of changes that Clint and John have succeeded in
introducing endure and are taken up by succeeding administrations.
MENZIES: Kris?
BOON: Just a quick question. The terrorist threat has become a
very apparent issue on the ground for Americans involved abroad,
and I am wondering how this is being contained in terms of current
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post-conflict reconstruction and whether this is influencing American
policy generally on post-conflict reconstruction.
SERWER: Well it is having a dramatic effect on capabilities in Iraq
and in Afghanistan. In Iraq none of us traveled outside the International Zone without shooters and armored cars. It is not a great way
to do business. There are a lot of courageous people though—and
this is invisible to the American public—but there are several hundred very courageous advisors to ministries in Iraq, and they work
quite frequently in Iraqi ministries, including the Interior Ministry,
and it is just a downright dangerous thing to do, and we owe a great
debt to those people who are doing it.
But our capabilities are severely limited in Iraq because of the
security situation. In Afghanistan, I think we are in a very anomalous
situation. I walked on the street in Kabul, freely without body armor,
without armored cars, without shooters, and I felt perfectly safe. In
fact, there is very little record of Western civilians being attacked in
Afghanistan in recent years, and it really is quite safe—remarkably so.
Nevertheless, the embassy, all the aid contractors are under severe security restrictions that are likely to continue, if I understood
what the Ambassador told me when I called him. And that is a real
problem because Afghanistan is, in many ways, more hopeful than
Iraq, and if we are not able to bring all of our tools there—and I
might add the U.N. is quite restricted in their movements in Afghanistan as well, so I think it is having a dramatically negative impact in
both Iraq and Afghanistan.
HERBST: There is another element to this too. When you put
people out in the field or, in my office, we would plant the people in
the field, security is an important consideration. Our folks are being
taught in going into dangerous environments, environments where
traditionally the State Department does not put people. But by the
same token, we have to provide a subsystem for them, and what that
means is that we plan operations, we plan a budget for operations.
And that drives the cost considerably, and that is also dangerous.
MENZIES: I would like to open the floor to our audience, particularly our students for some questions. We have a few minutes left and
I would like to take full advantage of it. We have microphones or if
they can just shout out a question and we will repeat it for everybody.
Do I see hands? Yes.
AUDIENCE SPEAKER: Hi. I am not a student. My name is Jenna
Slotin, and I am from the International Peace Academy. I decided to
come to New Jersey from my office in Midtown. I thank you for your
presentation today.
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One question I have is that, you touched on training and doctrine with respect to a civilian reserve corps, and certainly, getting
trained professionals in place is critical for the person who is picked.
But I think a very important and a close second is that those individuals are not only trained to set up the judiciary, the correction system,
public administration, but trained to transfer those skills to local officials. And I think we have seen in the field of development, and now
post-conflict reconstruction, capacity building is not done well, and
the transfer of those skills is a serious challenge. But that is what is
going to prevent us from needing to go back five years down the
road; setting up an effective and capable state is of primary importance.
And so, I wonder if you are taking measures to integrate into the
work training for a civilian reserve corps [with] training capacity for
local officials.
HERBST: Right now, we do not have a civilian reserve corps. We
are doing planning to provide training for them. You can be sure
that what we have in mind is capacity transfer. We do not want to be
in any specific country any longer than we have to. So the purpose is
to put people on the ground who are able to oversee the provision of
services, one, and two, to make sure that they train local people or
find the right local people who continue that provision of services so
they can leave.
SERWER: And maybe I can add just a word. That is one of our
projected courses is in fact on the military and transferring the capability, but I recently had to re-do it as well, already. I mentioned our
Reconciliation Conference from Mahmoudiyah; it was actually conducted by a set of Iraqi facilitators who we trained a couple of years
before. I was there to make sure things kept on track and had a role
to play, especially in preparing some of the statements. The actual
activity was conducted by Iraqis who were conducting such activities
in their own communities day by day.
WILLIAMSON: If I could just point out one other point. Just from
a practical point of view, having done this in Kosovo and again in
Iraq, there is always a tension between two objectives.
In Kosovo there was a big concern because there was a lack of
stability there and that rule of law was not succeeding. So when I
went in after two years of the mission being off the ground, I had a
very strong mandate to go in and have a more robust interventionist
policy, using international judges and prosecutors, where we were actually taking away some of the responsibilities that had already
evolved to locals.
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And so you had competing pressures. I had people from the development side saying, you have got to do more in terms of capacity
building. Every time we would start down that road, you would get
the competing pressure from NATO countries saying, you have got to
do more about crime so that we can get our troops out here. And
this is a dynamic that goes on in every one of these settings, and while
it is easy to talk about doing capacity building, you are always going to
come up against this hurdle as you try to implement it.

